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Temporary Read-Only Permissions
for Separation Logic
Arthur Charguéraud and François Pottier
Inria‹
Abstract. We present an extension of Separation Logic with a general
mechanism for temporarily converting any assertion (or “permission”) to
a read-only form. No accounting is required: our read-only permissions
can be freely duplicated and discarded. We argue that, in circumstances
where mutable data structures are temporarily accessed only for reading,
our read-only permissions enable more concise specifications and proofs.
The metatheory of our proposal is verified in Coq.
1 Introduction
Separation Logic [30] offers a natural and effective framework for proving the
correctness of imperative programs that manipulate the heap. It is exploited in
many implemented program verification systems, ranging from fully automated
systems, such as Infer [9], through semi-interactive systems, such as Smallfoot [4],
jStar [15], and VeriFast [22], to fully interactive systems (embedded within a
proof assistant), such as the Verified Software Toolchain [1] and Charge! [3], to
cite just a few. The CFML system, developed by the first author [10,11], can
be viewed as a member of the latter category. We have used it to verify many
sequential data structures and algorithms, representing several thousand lines of
OCaml code.
1.1 Redundancy in specifications
Our experience with Separation Logic at scale in CFML leads us to observe
that many specifications suffer from a somewhat unpleasant degree of verbosity,
which results from a frequent need to repeat part of the precondition in the
postcondition. This repetition is evident already in the Separation Logic axiom
for dereferencing a pointer:
traditional read axiom
t𝑙 ãÑ 𝑣u pget 𝑙q t𝜆𝑦. r𝑦 “ 𝑣s ‹ 𝑙 ãÑ 𝑣u
This axiom states that “if initially the memory location 𝑙 stores the value 𝑣,
then dereferencing 𝑙 yields the value 𝑣 and, after this operation, 𝑙 still stores 𝑣.”
‹ This research was partly supported by the French National Research Agency (ANR)
under the grant ANR-15-CE25-0008.
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Arguably, to a human reader, the last part of this statement may seem obvious,
even though it is not formally redundant.
Beginning with this axiom, this redundancy contaminates the entire system.
It arises not only when a single memory cell is read, but, more generally, every
time a data structure is accessed for reading. To illustrate this, consider a func-
tion array concat that expects (pointers to) two arrays 𝑎1 and 𝑎2 and returns
(a pointer to) a new array 𝑎3 whose content is the concatenation of the contents
of 𝑎1 and 𝑎2. Its specification in Separation Logic would be as follows:
t𝑎1  Array𝐿1 ‹ 𝑎2  Array𝐿2u
parray concat 𝑎1 𝑎2q
t𝜆𝑎3. 𝑎3  Array p𝐿1 `̀ 𝐿2q ‹ 𝑎1  Array𝐿1 ‹ 𝑎2  Array𝐿2u
(1)
We assume that 𝑎 Array𝐿 asserts the existence (and unique ownership) of an
array at address 𝑎 whose content is given by the list 𝐿. A separating conjunction ‹
is used in the precondition to require that 𝑎1 and 𝑎2 be disjoint arrays. Its
use in the postcondition guarantees that 𝑎3 is disjoint with 𝑎1 and 𝑎2. In this
specification, again, the fact that the arrays 𝑎1 and 𝑎2 are unaffected must be
explicitly stated as part of the postcondition, making the specification seem
verbose.
Ideally, we would like to write a more succinct specification, which directly
expresses the idea that the arrays 𝑎1 and 𝑎2 are only read by array concat , even
though they are mutable arrays. Such a specification could be as follows, where
“RO” is a read-only modality, whose exact meaning remains to be explained:
tROp𝑎1  Array𝐿1q ‹ ROp𝑎2  Array𝐿2qu
parray concat 𝑎1 𝑎2q
t𝜆𝑎3. 𝑎3  Array p𝐿1 `̀ 𝐿2qu
(2)
The idea is, because only read access to 𝑎1 and 𝑎2 is granted, these arrays cannot
be modified or deallocated by the call array concat 𝑎1 𝑎2. Therefore, the post-
condition need not say anything about these arrays: that would be redundant.
1.2 Can “RO” be interpreted by macro-expansion?
At this point, the reader may wonder whether the meaning of “RO” could be
explained by a simple macro-expansion process. That is, assuming that “RO”
is allowed to appear only at the top level of the precondition, the Hoare triple
tROp𝐻1q‹𝐻2u 𝑡 t𝑄u could be viewed as syntactic sugar for t𝐻1‹𝐻2u 𝑡 t𝐻1‹𝑄u.
Such sugar is easy to implement; in fact, CFML offers it, under the notation
“INV”, for “invariant”. However, this näıve interpretation suffers from several
shortcomings, which can be summarized as follows:
1. It reduces apparent redundancy in specifications,
but does not eliminate the corresponding redundancy in proofs.
2. It does not allow read-only state to be aliased.
3. It leads to deceptively weak specifications.
4. It can lead to unusably weak specifications.
In the following, we expand on each of these points.
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Shortcoming 1: does not reduce proof effort Under the näıve interpretation of
“RO” as macro-expansion, the Hoare triple tROp𝐻1q‹𝐻2u 𝑡 t𝑄u is just syntactic
sugar. The presence or absence of this sugar has no effect on the proof obliga-
tions that the user must fulfill. Even though the sugar hides the presence of the
conjunct 𝐻1 in the postcondition, it really is still there. So, the user must prove
that 𝐻1 holds upon termination of the command 𝑡. This might take several proof
steps: for example, several predicate definitions might need to be folded. In other
words, the issue that we would like to address is not just undesired verbosity; it
is also undesired work.
In this paper, we intend to give direct semantic meaning to “RO”. In this
approach, tROp𝐻1q ‹𝐻2u 𝑡 t𝑄u is an ordinary Hoare triple, whose postcondition
does not mention 𝐻1. Thus, there is no need for the user to argue that 𝐻1 holds
upon termination. The proof effort is therefore reduced.
Shortcoming 2: does not allow aliasing read-only state Under the näıve inter-
pretation of “RO”, our proposed specification of array concat (2) is just sugar
for the obvious specification (1), therefore means that array concat must be ap-
plied to two disjoint arrays. Yet, in reality, a call of the form “array concat 𝑎 𝑎”
is safe and makes sense. To allow it, one could prove another specification for
array concat , dealing specifically with the case where an array is concatenated
with itself:
t𝑎 Array𝐿u
parray concat 𝑎 𝑎q
t𝜆𝑎3. 𝑎3  Array p𝐿 `̀ 𝐿q ‹ 𝑎 Array𝐿u
(3)
However, that would imply extra work: firstly, when array concat is defined, as
its code must be verified twice; secondly, when it is invoked, as the user may
need to indicate which of the two specifications (1) and (3) should be used.
In this paper, we define the meaning of “RO” in such a way that every read-
only assertion is duplicable: that is, ROp𝐻q entails ROp𝐻q ‹ ROp𝐻q. Thanks to
this property, our proposed specification of array concat (2) allows justifying
the call “array concat 𝑎 𝑎”. In fact, under our reasoning rules, specification (2)
subsumes both of the specifications (1) and (3) that one would need in the
absence of read-only assertions.
Shortcoming 3: deceptively weak Under the näıve interpretation of “RO” as
macro-expansion, the Hoare triple tROp𝐻1q ‹𝐻2u 𝑡 t𝑄u does not guarantee that
the memory covered by 𝐻1 is unaffected by the execution of the command 𝑡.
Instead, it means only that 𝐻1 still holds upon termination of 𝑡. To see this,
imagine that the assertion ℎ  HashTable𝑀 means “the hash table at address
ℎ currently represents the dictionary 𝑀”. A function population, which returns
the number of entries in a hash table, could have the following specification:
tROpℎ HashTable𝑀qu ppopulation ℎq t𝜆𝑦. r𝑦 “ card𝑀 su (4)
Under the macro-expansion interpretation, this specification guarantees that
ℎ  HashTable𝑀 is preserved, so, after a call to population, the table ℎ still
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represents the dictionary 𝑀 . Somewhat subtly, this does not guarantee that the
concrete data structure is unchanged. In fact, a function resize, which doubles
the physical size of the table and profoundly affects its organization in memory,
would admit a similar specification:
tROpℎ HashTable𝑀qu presize ℎq t𝜆pq. rsu (5)
In this paper, we define the meaning of “RO” in such a way that it really
means “read-only”. Therefore, the above specification of population (4) acquires
stronger meaning, and guarantees that population does not modify the hash
table. The specification of resize (5) similarly acquires stronger meaning, and
can no longer be established, since resize does modify the hash table. A valid
specification of resize is tℎ HashTable𝑀u presize ℎq t𝜆pq. ℎ HashTable𝑀u.
Shortcoming 4: unusably weak The weakness of the above specifications is not
only somewhat unexpected and deceptive: there are in fact situations where it
is problematic.
Imagine that a hash table is internally represented as a record of several
fields, among which is a data field, holding a pointer to an array. The abstract
predicate ℎ HashTable𝑀 might then be defined as follows:
ℎ HashTable𝑀 :“
D𝑎. D𝐿. pℎ tdata “ 𝑎; . . .u ‹ 𝑎 Array𝐿 ‹ . . .q
(6)
Suppose we wish to verify an operation foo, inside the “hash table” module,
whose code begins as follows:
let foo ℎ “
let 𝑑 “ ℎ.data in – read the address of the array
let 𝑝 “ population ℎ in – call population
. . .
A proof outline for this function must begin as follows:
1 let foo ℎ “
2 tℎ HashTable𝑀u – foo’s precondition
3 tℎ tdata “ 𝑎; . . .u ‹ 𝑎 Array𝐿 ‹ . . .u – by unfolding
4 let 𝑑 “ ℎ.data in
5 tℎ tdata “ 𝑎; . . .u ‹ 𝑎 Array𝐿 ‹ . . . ‹ r𝑑 “ 𝑎su – by reading
6 tℎ HashTable𝑀 ‹ r𝑑 “ 𝑎su – by folding
7 let 𝑝 “ population ℎ in
8 tℎ HashTable𝑀 ‹ r𝑑 “ 𝑎s ‹ r𝑝 “ #𝑀 su
9 . . .
At line 3, we unfold ℎ  HashTable𝑀 . Two auxiliary variables, 𝑎 and 𝐿,
are introduced at this point; their scope extends to the end of the proof outline.
This unfolding step is mandatory: indeed, the read instruction at line 4 requires
ℎ tdata “ 𝑎; . . .u. This instruction produces the pure assertion r𝑑 “ 𝑎s, which
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together with the assertion ℎ tdata “ 𝑎; . . .u means that 𝑑 is the current value
of the field h.data.
At line 6, we fold ℎ  HashTable𝑀 . This is mandatory: indeed, under the
näıve interpretation of “RO”, the precondition of the call “population ℎ” is ℎ 
HashTable𝑀 . Unfortunately, this folding step is harmful: it causes us to lose
ℎ tdata “ 𝑎; . . .u and thereby to forget that 𝑑 is the current value of the field
h.data. (The equation 𝑑 “ 𝑎 remains true, but becomes useless.) Yet, in reality,
this fact is preserved through the call, which does not modify the hash table.
In summary, because the specification of population (4) is too weak, calling
population at line 7 causes us to lose the benefit of the read instruction at line 4.
In this particular example, one could work around the problem by exchanging
the two instructions. In general, though, it might not be possible or desirable
to modify the code so as to facilitate the proof. Another work-around is to
equip population with a lower-level specification, where the predicate HashTable
is manually unfolded.
We have demonstrated that, under the näıve interpretation, the specification
of population (4) can be unsuitable for use inside the “hash table” abstraction.
In this paper, we define the meaning of “RO” in such a way that all of the
information that is available at line 5 is preserved through the call to population.
This is explained later on (§2.5).
1.3 Towards true read-only permissions
The question that we wish to address is: what is a simple extension of sequential
Separation Logic with duplicable temporary read-only permissions1 for mutable
data?
We should stress that we are primarily interested in a logic of sequential
programs. We do discuss structured parallelism and shared-memory concurrency
near the end of the paper (§6.2).
We should also emphasize that we are not interested in read permissions for
permanently immutable data, which are a different concept. Such permissions
can be found, for instance, in Mezzo [2], and could be introduced in Separation
Logic, if desired. They, too, grant read access only, and are duplicable. Mezzo
allows converting a unique read-write permission to a duplicable read permission,
but not the other way around: the transition from mutable to immutable state is
irrevocable. Mezzo has no mechanism for obtaining a temporary read-only view
of a mutable data structure.
Finally, we should say a word of fractional permissions (which are discussed
in greater depth in §5.4). Fractional permissions [6] can be used to obtain tem-
porary read-only views of mutable data. A fraction that is strictly less than 1
grants read-only access, and, by joining all shares so as to recover the fraction 1,
a unique read-write access permission can be recovered. Nevertheless, fractional
permissions are not what we seek. They do not address our shortcoming 1: their
1 Following Boyland [6], Balabonski et al. [2], and others, we use the words “assertion”
and “permission” interchangeably.
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ROpr𝑃 sq “ r𝑃 s
ROp𝐻1 ‹𝐻2q Ź ROp𝐻1q ‹ ROp𝐻2q (the reverse is false)
ROp𝐻1 _ 𝐻2q “ ROp𝐻1q _ ROp𝐻2q
ROpD𝑥.𝐻q “ D𝑥.ROp𝐻q
ROpROp𝐻qq “ ROp𝐻q
ROp𝐻q Ź ROp𝐻 1q if 𝐻 Ź 𝐻 1
ROp𝐻q “ ROp𝐻q ‹ ROp𝐻q
Fig. 1. Properties of RO
use requires work that we wish to avoid, namely “accounting” (arithmetic reason-
ing) as well as (universal and existential) quantification over fraction variables.
Furthermore, whereas ROpℎ HashTable𝑀q is a well-formed permission in our
logic, in most systems of fractional permissions, 12 pℎ HashTable𝑀q is not well-
formed. The systems that do allow this kind of “scaling”, such as Boyland’s [7],
do so at the cost of restricting disjunction and existential quantification so that
they are “precise”.
In this paper, we answer the above question. We introduce a generic assertion
transformer, “RO”. For any assertion 𝐻, it is permitted to form the assertion
ROp𝐻q, which offers read-only access to the memory covered by 𝐻. For instance,
ROp𝑥 ãÑ 𝑣q offers read-only access to the memory cell at address 𝑥. The tem-
porary conversion from a permission 𝐻 to its read-only counterpart ROp𝐻q is
performed within a lexically-delimited scope, via a “read-only frame rule”. Upon
entry into the scope, 𝐻 is replaced with ROp𝐻q. Within the scope, ROp𝐻q can
be duplicated if desired, and some copies can be discarded; there is no need to
keep track of all shares and recombine them so as to regain a full permission.
Upon exit of the scope, the permission 𝐻 re-appears.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, we review our additions
to Separation Logic (§2). Then, we give a formal, self-contained presentation
of our logic (§3) and of its model, which we use to establish the soundness
of the logic (§4). The soundness proof is formalized in Coq and can be found
online [12]. Then, we review some of the related work (§5), discuss some potential
applications and extensions of our logic (§6), and conclude (§7).
2 Overview
In this section, we describe our additions to Separation Logic, with which we
assume a basic level of familiarity. The following sections describe our logic (§3)
and its model (§4) in full, and may serve as a reference.
2.1 A “read-only” modality
To begin with, we introduce read-only permissions in the syntax of permissions.
Informally, the permission ROp𝐻q controls the same heap fragment as the per-
mission 𝐻, but can be used only for reading. A more precise understanding of
the meaning of “RO” is given by the semantic model (§4.1).
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The “RO” modality enjoys several important properties, shown in Figure 1,
where the symbol Ź denotes entailment. When applied to a pure assertion r𝑃 s,
“RO” vanishes. It can be pushed into a separating conjunction: ROp𝐻1 ‹ 𝐻2q
entails ROp𝐻1q ‹ ROp𝐻2q. The reverse entailment is false
2. Because of this, one
might worry that exploiting the entailment ROp𝐻1 ‹ 𝐻2q Ź ROp𝐻1q ‹ ROp𝐻2q
causes a loss of information. This is true, but if that is a problem, then one
can exploit the equality ROp𝐻1 ‹ 𝐻2q “ ROp𝐻1 ‹ 𝐻2q ‹ ROp𝐻1q ‹ ROp𝐻2q
instead. “RO” commutes with disjunction and existential quantification. “RO”
is idempotent3. A read-only permission for a single cell of memory, ROp𝑙 ãÑ 𝑣q,
cannot be rewritten into a simpler form, which is why there is no equation for
it in Figure 1. It can be exploited via the new read axiom (§2.4). The last two
lines of Figure 1 respectively state that “RO” is covariant and that read-only
permissions are duplicable.
Together, these rules allow pushing “RO” into composite permissions. For
instance, if ℎ  HashTable𝑀 is defined as before (§1, (6)), then the read-only
permission ROpℎ HashTable𝑀q entails:
D𝑎. D𝐿. pROpℎ tdata “ 𝑎; . . .uq ‹ ROp𝑎 Array𝐿q ‹ ROp. . .qq
In other words, “read-only access to a hash table” implies read-only access to
the component objects of the table, as expected.
2.2 A read-only frame rule
To guarantee the soundness of our extension of Separation Logic with read-only
permissions, we must enforce one key metatheoretical invariant, namely: a mem-
ory location is never governed at the same time by a read-write permission and
by a read permission. Indeed, if two such permissions were allowed to coexist,
the read-write permission by itself would allow writing a new value to this mem-
ory location. The read permission would not be updated (it could be framed
out, hence invisible, during the write) and would therefore become stale (that
is, carry out-of-date information about the value stored at this location). That
would be unsound.
In order to forbid the co-existence of read-write and read-only permissions
for a single location, we propose enforcing the following informal rules:
1. Read-only permissions obey a lexical scope (or “block”) discipline.
2. Upon entry into a block, a permission 𝐻
can be replaced with its read-only counterpart ROp𝐻q.
3. Upon exit of this block, the permission 𝐻 reappears.
4. No read-only permissions are allowed to exit the block.
2 If it were true, then we would have the following chain of equalities: ROp𝑙 ãÑ 𝑣q “
ROp𝑙 ãÑ 𝑣q ‹ ROp𝑙 ãÑ 𝑣q “ ROp𝑙 ãÑ 𝑣 ‹ 𝑙 ãÑ 𝑣q “ ROprFalsesq “ rFalses.
3 In practice, this property should not be useful, because permissions of the form
ROpROp𝐻qq never appear: the read-only frame rule (§2.2) is formulated in such a
way that it cannot give rise to such a permission.
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normal r𝑃 s normal p𝑥 ãÑ 𝑣q
normal𝐻1 normal𝐻2
normal p𝐻1 ‹𝐻2q
normal𝐻1 normal𝐻2
normal p𝐻1 _ 𝐻2q
@𝑥. normal𝐻
normal pD𝑥.𝐻q
Fig. 2. Properties of normal
Roughly speaking, there is no danger of co-existence between read-write and
read permissions when a block is entered, because 𝐻 is removed at the same
time ROp𝐻q is introduced. There is no danger either when this block is exited,
even though 𝐻 reappears, because no read-only permissions are allowed to exit.
Technically, all four informal rules above take the form of a single reasoning
rule, the “read-only frame rule”, which subsumes the frame rule of Separation
Logic. The frame rule allows an assertion 𝐻 1 to become hidden inside a block:
𝐻 1 disappears upon entry, and reappears upon exit of the block. The read-only
frame rule does this as well, and in addition, makes the read-only permission
ROp𝐻 1q available within the block. In our system, the two rules are as follows:
frame rule
t𝐻u 𝑡 t𝑄u normal𝐻 1
t𝐻 ‹𝐻 1u 𝑡 t𝑄 ‹𝐻 1u
read-only frame rule
t𝐻 ‹ ROp𝐻 1qu 𝑡 t𝑄u normal𝐻 1
t𝐻 ‹𝐻 1u 𝑡 t𝑄 ‹𝐻 1u
The frame rule (above, left) is in fact just a special case of the read-only frame
rule (above, right). Indeed, a read-only permission can be discarded at any time
(using rule discard-pre from Figure 4). Thus, the frame rule can be derived by
applying the read-only frame rule and immediately discarding ROp𝐻 1q.
Both rules above have the side condition normal𝐻 1, which requires 𝐻 1 to be
“normal”. Its role is to ensure that “no read-only permissions are allowed to exit
the block”. “Normality” can be understood in several ways:
1. A syntactic understanding is that a permission is “normal” if “RO” does
not occur in it. This view is supported by the rules in Figure 2. The one
thing to remark about these rules is that there is no rule whose conclusion
is normalpROp𝐻qq.
2. A semantic understanding is given when we set up a model of our logic (§4.1).
There, we define what it means for a heap, where each memory location is
marked either as read-write or as read-only, to satisfy a permission. Then, a
permission is “normal” if a heap that satisfies it cannot contain any read-only
memory locations.
Because of the normality condition in the read-only frame rule, a Hoare triple
t𝐻u 𝑡 t𝑄u typically4 has a normal postcondition 𝑄. This means that read-only
4 If we restricted the rule of consequence in Figure 4 by adding the side condition
normal𝑄, then we would be able to prove that every triple t𝐻u 𝑡 t𝑄u that can
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permissions can only be “passed down”, from caller to callee. They cannot be
“passed back up”, from callee to caller.
2.3 A framed sequencing rule
The sequencing rule of Separation Logic (below, left) remains sound in our logic.
However, in a setting where postconditions must be normal (or are typically
normal), this rule is weaker than desired: it does not allow read-only permissions
to be distributed into its second premise. Indeed, suppose 𝑄1 is normal, as it is
the postcondition of the first premise. Unfortunately, 𝑄1 is also the precondition
of the second premise. This means that no read-only permissions are available in
the proof of 𝑡2. Yet, in practice, it is useful and desirable to be able to thread one
or more read-only permissions through a sequence of instructions. We remedy
the problem by giving a slightly generalized sequencing rule (below, right), which
allows an arbitrary permission 𝐻 1 to be framed out of 𝑡1 and therefore passed
directly to 𝑡2.
traditional sequencing rule
t𝐻u 𝑡1 t𝑄
1u t𝑄1u 𝑡2 t𝑄u
t𝐻u p𝑡1 ; 𝑡2q t𝑄u
framed sequencing rule
t𝐻u 𝑡1 t𝑄
1u t𝑄1 ‹𝐻 1u 𝑡2 t𝑄u
t𝐻 ‹𝐻 1u p𝑡1 ; 𝑡2q t𝑄u
In Separation Logic, the “framed sequencing rule” can be derived from the
sequencing rule and the frame rule. Here, conversely, it is viewed as a primitive
reasoning rule; the traditional sequencing rule can be derived from it, if desired.
When a read-only permission is available at the beginning of a sequence of
instructions, it is in fact available to every instruction in the sequence. This is
expressed by the following rule, which can be derived from the framed sequencing
rule, the rule of consequence, and from the fact that read-only permissions are
duplicable.
read-only sequencing rule
t𝐻 ‹ ROp𝐻 1qu 𝑡1 t𝑄
1u t𝑄1 ‹ ROp𝐻 1qu 𝑡2 t𝑄u
t𝐻 ‹ ROp𝐻 1qu p𝑡1 ; 𝑡2q t𝑄u
2.4 A new read axiom
The axiom for reading a memory cell must be generalized so as to accept a read-
only permission (instead of a read-write permission) as proof that reading is
permitted. The traditional axiom (below, left) requires a read-write permission
𝑙 ãÑ 𝑣, which it returns. The new axiom (below, right) requires a read-only
permission ROp𝑙 ãÑ 𝑣q, which it discards.
traditional read axiom
t𝑙 ãÑ 𝑣u pget 𝑙q t𝜆𝑦. r𝑦 “ 𝑣s ‹ 𝑙 ãÑ 𝑣u
new read axiom
tROp𝑙 ãÑ 𝑣qu pget 𝑙q t𝜆𝑦. r𝑦 “ 𝑣su
The traditional read axiom remains sound, and can in fact be derived from the
new read axiom and the read-only frame rule.
be established using the reasoning rules has a normal postcondition 𝑄. We did not
restrict the rule of consequence in this way because this is technically not necessary.
10 Arthur Charguéraud and François Pottier
2.5 Illustration
Recall the hypothetical operation foo that was used earlier (§1.2) to illustrate our
claim that faking read-only permissions by macro-expansion is unsatisfactory.
Let us carry out this proof again, this time with our read-only permissions. As
before, we assume that population requires read access to the hash table. This
is expressed by specification (4), which we repeat here:
tROpℎ HashTable𝑀qu ppopulation ℎq t𝜆𝑦. r𝑦 “ #𝑀 su
We will use the following derived rule, which follows from the read-only frame
rule, the rule of consequence, and the fact that “RO” is covariant:
read-only frame rule (with consequence)
𝐻 1 Ź𝐻2 t𝐻 ‹ ROp𝐻2qu 𝑡 t𝑄u normal𝐻 1
t𝐻 ‹𝐻 1u 𝑡 t𝑄 ‹𝐻 1u
This rule differs from the read-only frame rule in that, instead of introducing
ROp𝐻 1q, this rule introduces ROp𝐻2q, where 𝐻2 is logically weaker than 𝐻 1.
Nevertheless, upon exit, the permission 𝐻 1 is recovered.
We can now give a new proof outline for foo:
1 let foo ℎ “
2 tℎ HashTable𝑀u
3 tℎ tdata “ 𝑎; . . .u ‹ 𝑎 Array𝐿 ‹ . . .u
4 let 𝑑 “ ℎ.data in
5 tℎ tdata “ 𝑎; . . .u ‹ 𝑎 Array𝐿 ‹ . . . ‹ r𝑑 “ 𝑎su
6 tROpℎ HashTable𝑀q ‹ r𝑑 “ 𝑎su
– by the read-only frame rule (with consequence)
7 let 𝑝 “ population ℎ in
8 tℎ tdata “ 𝑎; . . .u ‹ 𝑎 Array𝐿 ‹ . . . ‹ r𝑑 “ 𝑎s ‹ r𝑝 “ #𝑀 su
9 . . .
Up to and including line 5, the outline is the same as in our previous attempt.
At this point, in order to justify the call to population, we wish to obtain the
read-only permission ROpℎ HashTable𝑀q. This is done by applying the read-
only frame rule (with consequence) around the call. We exploit the entailment
pℎ tdata “ 𝑎; . . .u‹𝑎 Array𝐿‹. . .q Ź pℎ HashTable𝑀q, which corresponds
to folding the HashTable predicate. Thus, for the duration of the call, we obtain
the read-only permission ROpℎ HashTable𝑀q. After the call, the more precise,
unfolded, read-write permission ℎ tdata “ 𝑎; . . .u‹𝑎 Array𝐿‹. . . reappears.
The loss of information in our first proof outline (§1.2) no longer occurs here.
3 Logic
In this section, we give a formal presentation of Separation Logic with read-only
permissions. We present the syntax of programs, the syntax of assertions, and
the reasoning rules. This is all a user of the logic needs to know. The semantic
model and the proof of soundness come in the next section (§4).
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eval-val
𝑣{𝑚 ó 𝑣{𝑚
eval-if
𝑛 ‰ 0 ^ 𝑡1{𝑚 ó 𝑣
1
{𝑚1
_ 𝑛 “ 0 ^ 𝑡2{𝑚 ó 𝑣
1
{𝑚1
pif 𝑛 then 𝑡1 else 𝑡2q{𝑚 ó 𝑣
1
{𝑚1
eval-let
𝑡1{𝑚 ó 𝑣1{𝑚
1
pr𝑣1{𝑥s 𝑡2q{𝑚
1
ó 𝑣{𝑚2
plet𝑥 “ 𝑡1 in 𝑡2q{𝑚 ó 𝑣{𝑚
2
eval-app
𝑣1 “ 𝜇𝑓.𝜆𝑥.𝑡
pr𝑣1{𝑓 s r𝑣2{𝑥s 𝑡q{𝑚 ó 𝑣
1
{𝑚1
p𝑣1 𝑣2q{𝑚 ó 𝑣
1
{𝑚1
eval-ref
𝑙 R dom𝑚 𝑚1 “ 𝑚Z p𝑙 ÞÑ 𝑣q
pref 𝑣q{𝑚 ó 𝑙{𝑚1
eval-get
𝑙 P dom𝑚 𝑣 “ 𝑚r𝑙s
pget 𝑙q{𝑚 ó 𝑣{𝑚
eval-set
𝑙 P dom𝑚 𝑚1 “ 𝑚r𝑙 :“ 𝑣s
pset 𝑙 𝑣q{𝑚 ó pq{𝑚1
Fig. 3. Big-step evaluation
3.1 Calculus
Our programming language is a 𝜆-calculus with references. Its syntax is as fol-
lows:
𝑣 :“ 𝑥 | pq | 𝑛 | 𝑙 | 𝜇𝑓.𝜆𝑥.𝑡
𝑡 :“ 𝑣 | if 𝑣 then 𝑡1 else 𝑡2 | let𝑥 “ 𝑡1 in 𝑡2 | p𝑣 𝑣q | ref 𝑣 | get 𝑣 | set 𝑣 𝑣
A value 𝑣 is either a variable 𝑥, the unit value pq, an integer constant 𝑛, a
memory location 𝑙, or a recursive function 𝜇𝑓.𝜆𝑥.𝑡. A term 𝑡 is either a value,
a conditional construct, a sequencing construct, a function call, or a primitive
instruction for allocating, reading, or writing a reference.
The big-step evaluation judgement (Figure 3) takes the form 𝑡{𝑚 ó 𝑣{𝑚1,
and asserts that the evaluation of the term 𝑡 in the memory 𝑚 terminates and
produces the value 𝑣 in the memory 𝑚1. A memory is a finite map of locations
to values.
3.2 Permissions
The syntax of permissions, also known as assertions, is as follows:
𝐻 :“ r𝑃 s | 𝑙 ãÑ 𝑣 | 𝐻1 ‹𝐻2 | 𝐻1 _ 𝐻2 | D𝑥.𝐻 | ROp𝐻q
All of these constructs are standard, except for ROp𝐻q, which represents a read-
only form of the permission 𝐻. The pure assertion r𝑃 s is true of an empty heap,
provided the proposition 𝑃 holds. 𝑃 is expressed in the metalanguage; in our
Coq formalisation, it is an arbitrary proposition of type Prop. In particular, a
Hoare triple t𝐻u 𝑡 t𝑄u (defined later on) is a proposition: this is important, as
it allows reasoning about first-class functions. The empty permission r s can be
viewed as syntactic sugar for rTrues. The permission 𝑙 ãÑ 𝑣 grants unique read-
write access to the reference cell at address 𝑙, and asserts that this cell currently
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read-only frame rule
t𝐻 ‹ ROp𝐻 1qu 𝑡 t𝑄u normal𝐻 1
t𝐻 ‹𝐻 1u 𝑡 t𝑄 ‹𝐻 1u
consequence
𝐻 Ź𝐻 1 t𝐻 1u 𝑡 t𝑄1u 𝑄1 Ź𝑄
t𝐻u 𝑡 t𝑄u
discard-pre
t𝐻u 𝑡 t𝑄u
t𝐻 ‹ GCu 𝑡 t𝑄u
discard-post
t𝐻u 𝑡 t𝑄 ‹ GCu
t𝐻u 𝑡 t𝑄u
extract-prop
𝑃 ñ t𝐻u 𝑡 t𝑄u
tr𝑃 s ‹𝐻u 𝑡 t𝑄u
extract-or
t𝐻1u 𝑡 t𝑄u t𝐻2u 𝑡 t𝑄u
t𝐻1 _ 𝐻2u 𝑡 t𝑄u
extract-exists
@𝑥. t𝐻u 𝑡 t𝑄u
tD𝑥.𝐻u 𝑡 t𝑄u
Fig. 4. Reasoning rules (structural)
contains the value 𝑣. Separating conjunction ‹, disjunction _ , and existential
quantification are standard. We omit ordinary conjunction ^ , partly because we
do not use it in practice when carrying out proofs in CFML, partly because we
did not have time to study whether the rule of conjunction holds in our logic.
From a syntactic standpoint, a “normal” permission is one that does not
contain any occurrences of “RO”. (Recall Figure 2.)
As usual in Separation Logic, permissions are equipped with an entailment
relation, written 𝐻1Ź𝐻2 (“𝐻1 entails 𝐻2”). It is a partial order. (In particular, it
is antisymmetric: we view two propositions that entail each other as equal.) The
standard connectives of Separation Logic enjoy their usual properties, which,
for the sake of brevity, we do not repeat. (For instance, separating conjunction
is associative, commutative, and admits r s as a unit.) In addition, read-only
permissions satisfy the laws of Figure 1, which have been explained earlier (§2.1).
3.3 Reasoning rules
As usual in Separation Logic, a Hoare triple takes the form t𝐻u 𝑡 t𝜆𝑦.𝐻 1u where
𝐻 and 𝐻 1 are permissions and 𝑡 is a term. The precondition 𝐻 expresses require-
ments on the initial state; the postcondition 𝜆𝑦.𝐻 1 offers guarantees about the
result 𝑦 of the computation and about the final state. We write 𝑄 for a postcon-
dition 𝜆𝑦.𝐻 1. For greater readability, we write 𝑄‹𝐻 1 for 𝜆𝑦. p𝑄𝑦‹𝐻 1q. We write
𝑄 _ 𝑄1 as a shorthand for 𝜆𝑦. p𝑄𝑦q _ p𝑄1 𝑦q. We write 𝑄 Ź𝑄1 as a shorthand
for @𝑦. p𝑄𝑦q Ź p𝑄1 𝑦q.
We adopt a total correctness interpretation, whereby a triple t𝐻u 𝑡 t𝜆𝑦.𝐻 1u
guarantees that (under the precondition 𝐻) the evaluation of 𝑡 terminates. This
is arbitrary: our read-only permissions would work equally well in a partial cor-
rectness setting.
The reasoning rules, by which Hoare triples can be established, are divided
in two groups: structural (or non-syntax-directed) rules (Figure 4) and syntax-
directed rules (Figure 5).
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val
tr su 𝑣 t𝜆𝑦. r𝑦 “ 𝑣su
if
𝑛 ‰ 0 ñ t𝐻u 𝑡1 t𝑄u
𝑛 “ 0 ñ t𝐻u 𝑡2 t𝑄u
t𝐻u pif 𝑛 then 𝑡1 else 𝑡2q t𝑄u
framed sequencing rule (let)
t𝐻u 𝑡1 t𝑄
1
u @𝑥. t𝑄1 𝑥 ‹𝐻 1u 𝑡2 t𝑄u
t𝐻 ‹𝐻 1u plet𝑥 “ 𝑡1 in 𝑡2q t𝑄u
app
𝑣1 “ 𝜇𝑓.𝜆𝑥.𝑡 t𝐻u pr𝑣1{𝑓 s r𝑣2{𝑥s 𝑡q t𝑄u
t𝐻u p𝑣1 𝑣2q t𝑄u
ref
tr su pref 𝑣q t𝜆𝑦. D𝑙. r𝑦 “ 𝑙s ‹ 𝑙 ãÑ 𝑣u
new read axiom (get)
tROp𝑙 ãÑ 𝑣qu pget 𝑙q t𝜆𝑦. r𝑦 “ 𝑣su
set
t𝑙 ãÑ 𝑣1u pset 𝑙 𝑣q t𝜆𝑦. 𝑙 ãÑ 𝑣u
Fig. 5. Reasoning rules (syntax-directed)
Among the structural rules, the only nonstandard rule is the read-only
frame rule, which has been explained earlier (§2.2). The rule of consequence
allows exploiting entailment to strengthen the precondition and weaken the post-
condition. The rules discard-pre and discard-post allow discarding part of the
pre- or postcondition. (The rule of consequence cannot be used for this purpose:
for instance, 𝑥 ãÑ 𝑣 does not entail r s.) The permission GC controls what per-
missions can be discarded. Here, we let GC stand for D𝐻.𝐻: this means that any
permission can be discarded5. The last three rules in Figure 4 are elimination
rules for pure assertions, disjunction, and existential quantification. Note that
the standard symmetric rule of disjunction, shown below, follows directly from
the rules extract-or and consequence.
disjunction
t𝐻1u 𝑡 t𝑄1u t𝐻2u 𝑡 t𝑄2u
t𝐻1 _ 𝐻2u 𝑡 t𝑄1 _ 𝑄2u
The syntax-directed reasoning rules appear in Figure 5. They are standard,
except for the framed sequencing rule and the new read axiom, which have
been explained earlier (§2.3, §2.4).
The implications in the premises of extract-prop and if and the universal
quantifiers in the premises of extract-exists and framed sequencing rule are
part of the metalanguage (which, in our formalization, is Coq). Thus, in real-
ity, we work with assertions of the form @𝛤. t𝐻u 𝑡 t𝑄u, where 𝛤 represents a
metalevel hypothesis.
5
D𝐻.𝐻 is equivalent to true. If the programming language had explicit deallocation
instead of garbage collection, one might wish to define GC as D𝐻.ROp𝐻q, which
means that read-only permissions can be implicitly discarded, but read-write per-
missions cannot. This restriction would be necessary in order to enforce “complete
collection”, that is, to ensure that every reference cell is eventually deallocated.
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3.4 Treatment of variables and functions
Our treatment of variables, as well as the manner in which we reason about
functions, may seem somewhat mysterious or unusual. We briefly explain them
here. This material is entirely independent of the issue of read-only permissions,
so this section may safely be skipped by a reader who wishes to focus on read-
only permissions.
In the paper presentation, we identify program variables with the variables
of the metalanguage. For example, in the framed sequencing rule, the name 𝑥
that occurs in the conclusion let𝑥 “ 𝑡1 in 𝑡2 denotes a program variable, while the
name 𝑥 that is universally quantified in the second premise denotes a variable
of the metalanguage.
In our Coq formalization, we clearly distinguish between program variables
and metavariables. On the one hand, program variables are explicitly represented
as identifiers (which may be implemented as integers or as strings). They are
explicitly embedded in the syntax of values. The type of values, Val, is inductively
defined (this is a “deep embedding”). On the other hand, metavariables are not
“represented as” anything. They are just Coq variables of type Val, that is,
they stand for an unknown value. To bridge the gap between program variables
and metavariables, a substitution is necessary. For example, in Coq, the framed
sequencing rule is formalized as follows:
@𝑥𝑡1𝑡2𝐻𝐻
1𝑄𝑄1. t𝐻u 𝑡1 t𝑄
1u
^ p@𝑋. t𝑄1𝑋 ‹𝐻 1u pr𝑋{𝑥s 𝑡2q t𝑄uq
ñ t𝐻 ‹𝐻 1u plet𝑥 “ 𝑡1 in 𝑡2q t𝑄u
Note how, in the second premise, a metavariable 𝑋 (of type Val) is substituted
for the program variable 𝑥 in the term 𝑡2. The metavariable 𝑋 denotes the
runtime value of the program variable 𝑥.
As one descends into the syntax of a term, metavariables are substituted for
program variables, as explained above. Thus, one can never reach a leaf that is
an occurrence of a program variable 𝑥! If a leaf labeled 𝑥 originally existed in
the term, it must be replaced with a value 𝑋 when the binder for 𝑥 is entered.
This explains a surprising feature of our reasoning rules, which is that they do
not allow reasoning about terms that have free program variables. The rule if, for
instance, allows reasoning about a term of the form pif 𝑛 then 𝑡1 else 𝑡2q, where
𝑛 is a literal integer value. It does not allow reasoning about pif 𝑥 then 𝑡1 else 𝑡2q,
where 𝑥 is a program variable. As argued above, this is not a problem. Similarly,
app expects the value 𝑣1 to be a 𝜆-abstraction; it does not allow 𝑣1 to be a
program variable. new read axiom and set expect the first argument of get and
set to be a literal memory location; it cannot be a program variable.
Another possibly mysterious aspect of our presentation is the treatment of
functions. In apparence, our only means of reasoning about functions is the
rule app, which states that, in order to reason about a call to a literal function
(a 𝜆-abstraction), one should substitute the actual arguments for the formal pa-
rameters in the function’s body, and reason about the term thus obtained. At
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first, this may not seem modular: in Hoare logic, one expects to first assign a
specification to each function, then check that each function body satisfies its
specification, under the assumption that each function call satisfies its specifica-
tion. In a total correctness setting, one must also establish termination.
It turns out that, by virtue of the power of the metalanguage, this style of
reasoning is in fact possible, based on the rules that we have given. We cannot
explain everything here, but present one rule for reasoning about the definition
and uses of a (possibly recursive) function. This rule can be derived from the
rules that we have given. It is as follows:
¨
˚
˝
@𝑆.@𝐹.
ˆˆ
@𝑋𝐻 1𝑄1. t𝐻 1u pr𝐹 {𝑓 s r𝑋{𝑥s 𝑡1q t𝑄
1u
ñ t𝐻 1u p𝐹 𝑋q t𝑄1u
˙
ñ 𝑆 𝐹
˙
^ p𝑆 𝐹 ñ t𝐻u pr𝐹 {𝑓 s 𝑡2q t𝑄uq
˛
‹
‚
ñ t𝐻u plet 𝑓 “ 𝜇𝑓.𝜆𝑥.𝑡1 in 𝑡2q t𝑄u
This rule provides a way of establishing a Hoare triple about a term of the
form let 𝑓 “ 𝜇𝑓.𝜆𝑥.𝑡1 in 𝑡2. In order to establish such a triple, it suffices to:
1. Pick a specification 𝑆, whose type is Val Ñ Prop. This is typically a Hoare
triple, which represents a specification of the function 𝜇𝑓.𝜆𝑥.𝑡1.
2. Establish the desired triple about the term 𝑡2, under the assumption that the
function satisfies the specification 𝑆. (This is the third line above.) In doing
so, one does not have access to the code of the function: it is represented by
a metavariable 𝐹 about which nothing is known but the hypothesis 𝑆 𝐹 .
3. Prove that the function satisfies the specification 𝑆. (These are the first two
lines above.) The function is still represented by a metavariable 𝐹 . This time,
one has access to the hypothesis that invoking 𝐹 is equivalent to executing
the function body 𝑡1, under a substitution of actual arguments for formal
parameters. If the function 𝜇𝑓.𝜆𝑥.𝑡1 is recursive, then this proof must involve
induction (which is carried out in the metalanguage).
4 Model
In this section, we establish the soundness of our extension of Separation Logic.
We first provide a concrete model of permissions, then give an interpretation of
triples with respect to which each of the reasoning rules is proved sound.
4.1 A model of permissions
In traditional Separation Logic, a permission is interpreted as a predicate over
heaps, also known as heap fragments. There, a “heap” coincides with what we
have called a “memory”, that is, a finite map of memory locations to values.
Then, famously, a separating conjunction 𝐻1 ‹ 𝐻2 is satisfied by a heap ℎ if
and only if ℎ is the disjoint union of two subheaps that respectively satisfy 𝐻1
and 𝐻2.
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Two memories 𝑚1 and 𝑚2 have disjoint domains:
𝑚1 K 𝑚2 ” dom𝑚1 X dom𝑚2 “ ∅
Two memories 𝑟1 and 𝑟2 agree on the intersection of their domains:
agree 𝑟1 𝑟2 ” @𝑙𝑣1𝑣2. p𝑙, 𝑣1q P 𝑟1 ^ p𝑙, 𝑣2q P 𝑟2 ñ 𝑣1 “ 𝑣2
Two heaps ℎ1 and ℎ2 are compatible:
compatible ℎ1 ℎ2 ” pagree ℎ1.r ℎ2.rq ^ pℎ1.f K ℎ2.f K pℎ1.rY ℎ2.rqq
The composition of two compatible heaps ℎ1 and ℎ2:
ℎ1 ` ℎ2 ” ppℎ1.fZ ℎ2.fq, pℎ1.rY ℎ2.rqq
Fig. 6. Compatibility and composition of heaps
r𝑃 s ” 𝜆ℎ. pℎ.f “ ∅q ^ pℎ.r “ ∅q ^ 𝑃
𝑙 ãÑ 𝑣 ” 𝜆ℎ. pℎ.f “ p𝑙 ÞÑ 𝑣qq ^ pℎ.r “ ∅q
𝐻1 ‹𝐻2 ” 𝜆ℎ. Dℎ1ℎ2. compatible ℎ1 ℎ2 ^ pℎ “ ℎ1 ` ℎ2q ^ 𝐻1 ℎ1 ^ 𝐻2 ℎ2
𝐻1 _ 𝐻2 ” 𝜆ℎ. 𝐻1 ℎ _ 𝐻2 ℎ
D𝑥.𝐻 ” 𝜆ℎ. D𝑥. 𝐻 ℎ
ROp𝐻q ” 𝜆ℎ. pℎ.f “ ∅q ^ Dℎ1. pℎ.r “ ℎ1.fZ ℎ1.rq ^ 𝐻 ℎ1
normalp𝐻q ” @ℎ. 𝐻 ℎ ñ ℎ.r “ ∅
𝐻1 Ź𝐻2 ” @ℎ. 𝐻1 ℎ ñ 𝐻2 ℎ
Fig. 7. Interpretation of permissions
In the following, we need a slightly more complex model, where a “heap” is a
richer object than a “memory”. Whereas a memory maps locations to values, a
heap must additionally map memory locations to access rights: that is, it must
keep track of which memory locations are considered accessible for reading and
writing and which memory locations are accessible only for reading. A permission
remains interpreted as a predicate over heaps.
We let a “heap” be a pair p𝑓, 𝑟q of two memories 𝑓 and 𝑟 whose domains are
disjoint6. (We let 𝑓 and 𝑟 range over memories.) The memory 𝑓 represents the
memory cells that are fully accessible, that is, accessible for reading and writing.
The memory 𝑟 represents the memory cells that are accessible only for reading.
We note that there exist other (isomorphic) concrete representations of heaps:
for instance, we could have defined a heap as a map of memory locations to pairs
of a value and an access right (either “read-write” or “read-only”).
We let ℎ range over heaps. We write ℎ.f for the first component of the pair ℎ
(that is, the read-write memory) and ℎ.r for its second component (the read-only
memory).
In traditional Separation Logic, two heaps are compatible (that is, can be
composed) if and only if they have disjoint domains, and their composition is just
6 Technically, in Coq, a heap is defined as a pair p𝑓, 𝑟q accompanied with a proof that
𝑓 and 𝑟 have disjoint domains. Thus, whenever in the paper we assemble a heap
p𝑓, 𝑟q, we have an implicit obligation to prove dom 𝑓 X dom 𝑟 “ ∅.
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their union. Here, because heaps contain information about access rights, we need
slightly more complex notions of compatibility and composition of heaps. These
notions are defined in Figure 6. We first introduce a few notations. We write
𝑚1 K 𝑚2 when the memories 𝑚1 and 𝑚2 have disjoint domains. By extension,
we write 𝑚1 K 𝑚2 K 𝑚3 when the memories 𝑚1, 𝑚2 and 𝑚3 have pairwise
disjoint domains. We write agree 𝑟1 𝑟2 when the memories 𝑟1 and 𝑟2 agree where
their domains overlap.
These notations allow us to succinctly state when two heaps ℎ1 and ℎ2 are
compatible. First, the read-only components of ℎ1 and ℎ2 must agree where
their domains overlap. Second, the read-write component of ℎ1, the read-write
component of ℎ2, and the combined read-only components of ℎ1 and ℎ2 must
have pairwise disjoint domains. When two heaps ℎ1 and ℎ2 are compatible, they
can be composed. Composition is performed component-wise, that is, by taking
the (disjoint) union of the read-write components and the (compatible) union of
the read-only components. (The hypothesis that ℎ1 and ℎ2 are compatible is used
to meet the proof obligation that ℎ1`ℎ2 is a well-formed heap whose read-write
and read-only components have disjoint domains.) Composition, where defined,
is associative and commutative.
The interpretation of permissions appears in Figure 7. The interpretation
of the standard permission forms is essentially standard: superficial adaptations
are required to deal with the fact that a heap is a pair of a read-write memory
and a read-only memory. The permission r𝑃 s is satisfied by a heap whose read-
write and read-only components are both empty, provided the proposition 𝑃
holds. The permission 𝑙 ãÑ 𝑣 is satisfied by a heap whose read-write component
is a singleton memory p𝑙 ÞÑ 𝑣q and whose read-only component is empty. The
permission 𝐻1 ‹𝐻2 is satisfied by a heap ℎ if and only if ℎ is the composition
of two (compatible) subheaps ℎ1 and ℎ2 which respectively satisfy 𝐻1 and 𝐻2.
The interpretation of disjunction and existential quantification is standard.
A key aspect is the interpretation of ROp𝐻q. A human-readable, yet relatively
accurate rendering of the formal meaning of ROp𝐻q is as follows: “we do not have
write access to any memory locations, but if we did have read-write (instead of
read-only) access to certain locations, then 𝐻 would hold”. Technically, this is
expressed as follows. The permission ROp𝐻q is satisfied by a heap ℎ if (1) the
read-write component of ℎ is empty and (2) the read-only component of ℎ is of
the form ℎ1.f Z ℎ1.r, where ℎ1 satisfies 𝐻. Thus, “RO” is a modality: it changes
the “world” (the heap) with respect to which 𝐻 is interpreted. In the outside
world ℎ, everything must be marked as read-only, whereas in the inside world ℎ1,
some locations may be marked as read-write.
As explained earlier (§2.2), the meaning of normal𝐻 is defined as follows: a
permission 𝐻 is normal if and only if every heap ℎ that satisfies it has an empty
read-only component.
Entailment is defined in a standard way: 𝐻1 Ź 𝐻2 holds if every heap that
satisfies 𝐻1 also satisfies 𝐻2.
Lemma 1. The above definitions validate the laws listed in Figures 1 and 2.
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4.2 A model of triples
We now wish to assign an interpretation to a Hoare triple of the form t𝐻u 𝑡 t𝑄u.
Then, each of the reasoning rules of the logic can be proved sound, independently,
by checking that it is a valid lemma. Before giving this interpretation, a couple
of auxiliary definitions are needed.
First, if ℎ is a heap, let tℎu be the memory ℎ.f Z ℎ.r. That is, tℎu is the
memory obtained by forgetting the distinction between read-write and read-
only locations in the heap ℎ. This definition serves as a link between memories,
which exist at runtime (they appear in the operational semantics: see Figure 3),
and heaps, which additionally contain access right information. This information
does not exist at runtime: it is “ghost” data.
Second, if 𝐻 is a permission, let on-some-rw-fragp𝐻q stand for the permission
(that is, the predicate over heaps) that holds of a heap ℎ if and only if ℎ is the
composition of two heaps ℎ1 and ℎ2, where ℎ1 has an empty read-only component
and satisfies 𝐻. In mathematical notation:
on-some-rw-fragp𝐻q ”
𝜆ℎ. Dℎ1ℎ2. compatible ℎ1 ℎ2 ^ ℎ “ ℎ1 ` ℎ2 ^ ℎ1.r “ ∅ ^ 𝐻 ℎ1
Intuitively, on-some-rw-fragp𝐻qℎ asserts that 𝐻 holds of a fragment of ℎ whose
read-only component is empty. This definition is used in the following to precisely
express the meaning of postconditions, which in reality do not apply to the whole
final heap, but to some fragment of the final heap whose read-only component
is empty, or equivalently, to “some read-write fragment” of the final heap.
The interpretation of triples is now defined as follows:
Definition 1 (Interpretation of triples). A semantic Hoare triple t𝐻u 𝑡 t𝑄u
is a short-hand for the following statement:
@ℎ1ℎ2.
"
compatible ℎ1 ℎ2
𝐻 ℎ1
ñ D𝑣ℎ11.
$
’
’
&
’
’
%
compatible ℎ11 ℎ2
𝑡{ tℎ1 ` ℎ2u ó 𝑣{ tℎ
1
1 ` ℎ2u
ℎ11.r “ ℎ1.r
on-some-rw-fragp𝑄𝑣qℎ11
In order to understand this definition, it is useful to first read the special
case where the heap ℎ2 is empty:
@ℎ1. 𝐻 ℎ1 ñ D𝑣ℎ
1
1.
$
&
%
𝑡{tℎ1u ó 𝑣{tℎ
1
1u
ℎ11.r “ ℎ1.r
on-some-rw-fragp𝑄𝑣qℎ11
This may be read as follows. Let ℎ1 be an arbitrary initial heap that satisfies
the permission 𝐻. Then, the term 𝑡, placed in the memory tℎ1u, runs safely and
terminates, returning a value 𝑣 in a final memory that can be described as tℎ11u,
for some heap ℎ11. The heap ℎ
1
1 obeys the constraint ℎ
1
1.r “ ℎ1.r, which means
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that the set of all read-only locations is unchanged7 and that the content of
these locations is unchanged as well. Last, the permission 𝑄 𝑣 is satisfied by
some read-write fragment of the heap ℎ11
8.
In the general case, where ℎ2 is an arbitrary heap, the definition of t𝐻u 𝑡 t𝑄u
states that the execution of the term 𝑡 cannot affect a subheap ℎ2 which 𝑡 “does
not know about”. Thus, running 𝑡 in an initial heap tℎ1 ` ℎ2u must yield a final
heap of the form tℎ11 ` ℎ2u. This requirement has the effect of “building the
frame rule into the interpretation of triples”. It is standard [14, Definition 11].
We note that the memories tℎ1u and tℎ2u are not necessarily disjoint: indeed, the
read-only components of the heaps ℎ1 and ℎ2 may have overlapping domains.
Theorem 1 (Soundness). The above definition of triples validates all of the
reasoning rules of Figures 4 and 5.
Proof. We refer the reader to our Coq formalization [12]. [\
5 Related work
5.1 The C/C++ “const” modifier
The C and C++ languages provide a type qualifier, const, which, when applied
to the type of a pointer, makes this pointer usable only for reading. For example,
a pointer of type const int* offers read access to an integer memory cell, but
does not allow mutating this cell. A pointer of type int* can be implicitly
converted to a pointer of type const int*.
The const qualifier arguably suffers from at least two important defects.
First, as aliasing is not restricted, the above conversion rule immediately implies
that a single pointer can perfectly well be stored at the same time in two distinct
variables of types const int* and int*. Thus, although const prevents writing
(through this pointer), it does not guarantee that the memory cell cannot be
written (through an alias). Second, const does not take effect “in depth”. If t
has type const tree*, for instance, then t->left has type tree*, as opposed
to const tree*. Thus, the const qualifier, applied to the type tree*, does not
forbid modifications to the tree.
For these reasons, when a function expects a const pointer to a mutable
data structure, one cannot be certain that this data structure is unaffected by
a call to this function. In contrast, our read-only permissions do offer such a
guarantee.
7 That is, no read-write locations become read-only, or vice-versa. This reflects the fact
that “RO” permissions appear and disappear following a lexical scope discipline. As
a consequence, any newly-allocated memory cells must be marked read-write in ℎ11.
8 The operator on-some-rw-frag is used here for two reasons. First, in the presence
of the rules discard-pre and discard-post, which discard arbitrary permissions,
one cannot expect the postcondition 𝑄 𝑣 to be satisfied by the whole final heap ℎ11.
Instead, one should expect 𝑄 𝑣 to be satisfied by a fragment of ℎ11. Second, 𝑄 𝑣 is
typically a normal permission, which can be satisfied only by a heap whose read-
only component is empty. So, one may expect that 𝑄 𝑣 is satisfied by a “read-write”
fragment of ℎ11.
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5.2 The “read-only frame” connective
Jensen et al. [23] present a Separation Logic for “low-level” code. It is “high-level”
in the sense that, even though machine code does not have a built-in notion of
function, the logic offers structured reasoning rules, including first- and higher-
order frame rules. The logic is stratified: assertions and specifications form two
distinct levels. At the specification level, one finds a “frame” connective b and
a “read-only frame” connective m.
When applied to the specification of a first-order function, the “frame” con-
nective has analogous effect to the “macro-expansion” scheme that was discussed
earlier (§1.2): framing such a specification 𝑆 with an assertion 𝑅 amounts to ap-
plying ‹𝑅 to the pre- and postcondition. Thus, if 𝑅 is (say) ℎ HashTable𝑀 ,
then the specification 𝑆 b 𝑅 states that ℎ must remain a valid hash table that
represents the dictionary 𝑀 , but does not require that the table be unchanged:
it could, for instance, be resized.
The “read-only frame” connective m is stronger: the specification 𝑆 m 𝑅
requires not just that the assertion 𝑅 be preserved, but that the concrete heap
fragment that satisfies 𝑅 be left in its initial state. It is defined on top of the
“frame” connective by bounded quantification. A typical use is to indicate that
the code of a function (which, in this machine model, is stored in memory)
must be accessible for reading, and is not modified when the function is called.
Jensen et al.’s “read-only frame” connective allows “read-only” memory to be
temporarily modified, as long as its initial state is restored upon exit. Therefore,
it is quite different from our read-only permissions, which at the same time
impose a restriction and offer a guarantee: they prevent the current function
from modifying the “read-only” memory, and they guarantee that a callee cannot
modify it either. Furthermore, our read-only permissions can be duplicated and
discarded, whereas Jensen et al.’s “read-only frame” connective exists at the
specification level: they have no read-only assertions.
5.3 Thoughts about lexical scope
The read-only frame rule takes advantage of lexical scope: it applies to a code
block with well-defined entry and exit points, and governs how permissions are
transformed when control enters and exits this block. Upon entry, a read-write
permission is transformed to a read-only permission; upon exit, no read-only
permissions are allowed to go through, and the original read-write permission
reappears. The soundness of this rule relies on the fact that read-only permissions
cannot escape through side channels9.
There are several type systems and program logics in the literature which
rely on lexical scope in a similar manner, sometimes for the same purpose (that
9 For instance, we do not have concurrency, so a read-only permission cannot be
transmitted to another thread via a synchronization operation. Furthermore, unlike
Mezzo [2], we do not allow a closure to capture a duplicable permission, so a read-
only permission cannot escape by becoming hidden in a closure.
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is, to temporarily allow shared read-only access to a mutable data structure),
sometimes for other purposes.
Wadler’s “let!” construct [32, §4], for instance, is explicitly designed to allow
temporary shared read-only access to a “linear value”, that is, in our terminol-
ogy, a uniquely-owned, mutable data structure. The “let!’ rule changes the type
of a variable 𝑥 from 𝑇 outside the block to !𝑇 inside the block, which means
that 𝑥 temporarily becomes shareable and accessible only for reading. In order
to ensure that no component of 𝑥 is accessed for reading after the block is exited,
Wadler requires a stronger property, namely that no component of 𝑥 is accessi-
ble through the result value. Furthermore, in order to enforce this property, he
imposes an even more conservative condition, namely that the result type 𝑈 be
“safe for 𝑇”. In comparison, things are simpler for us. Separation Logic distin-
guishes values and permissions: thus, we do not care if a value (the address of 𝑥,
or of a component of 𝑥) escapes, as long as no read permission escapes. Further-
more, in our setting, it is easy to enforce the latter condition. Technically, the
side condition “normal𝐻 1” in the read-only frame rule plays this role. At a
high level, this side condition implies that read-only permissions appear only in
preconditions, never in postconditions. In Wadler’s system, in contrast, the “!”
modality describes both inputs and outputs, and describes both permanently-
immutable and temporarily-read-only data, so things are less clear-cut.
In Vault [17], the “focus” mechanism temporarily yields a unique read-write
permission for an object that inhabits a region (therefore, can be aliased, so
normally would be accessible only for reading). Meanwhile, the permission to
access this region is removed. This is essentially the dual of the problem that we
are addressing! In the case of “focus”, it is comparatively easy to ensure that the
temporary read-write permission does not escape: as this is a unique permission,
it suffices to require it upon exit. For the same reason, it is possible to relax the
lexical scope restriction by using an explicit linear implication [17, §6]. Boyland
and Retert’s explanation of “borrowing” [8] is also in terms of “focus”.
Gordon et al. [18] describe a variant of C# where four kinds of references are
distinguished, namely: ordinary writable references; readable references, which
come with no write permission and no guarantee; immutable references, which
come with a guarantee that nobody has (or will ever have) write permission; and
isolated references, which form a unique entry point into a cluster of objects.
Quite strikingly, the system does not require any accounting. Lexical scope is
exploited in several interesting ways. In particular, the “isolation recovery” rule
states that, if, upon entry into a block, only isolated and immutable references are
available, and if, upon exit of that block, a single writable reference is available,
then this reference can safely be viewed as isolated. (The soundness of this rule
relies on the fact that there are no mutable global variables.) This rule may seem
superficially analogous to the read-only frame rule, in that a unique permission
is lost and recovered. It is unclear to us whether there is a deeper connection.
The system has a typing rule for structured parallelism and allows a mutable
data structure to be temporarily shared (for reading) by several threads.
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Gordon et al.’s work is part of a line of research on “reference immutability”,
where type qualifiers are used to control object mutation. We refer to the reader
to Gordon et al.’s paper [18] and to Potanin et al.’s survey [27]. Coblenz et al.’s
recent study of language support for immutability [13] is also of interest.
Rust [31] has lexically-scoped “borrows”, including “immutable borrows”,
during which multiple temporary read-only pointers into a uniquely-owned mu-
table data structure can be created. The borrowing discipline does not require
any counting, but involves “lifetimes”, a form of region variables. Lifetimes can
often be hidden in the surface syntax, but must sometimes be exposed to the
programmer. In contrast, our read-only permissions require neither counting nor
region variables. Reed [29] offers a tentative formal description of Rust’s bor-
rowing discipline.
5.4 Fractional permissions
Fractional permissions were introduced by Boyland [6] with the specific purpose
of enabling temporary shared read-only access to a data structure. They have
been integrated into several variants of Concurrent Separation Logic [5,19,21]
and generalized in several ways, e.g., by replacing fractions with more abstract
“shares” [16]. They are available in several program verification tools, including
VeriFast [22], Chalice [24,20], and the Verified Software Toolchain [1].
In its simplest incarnation, a fractional permission takes the form 𝑙
𝛼
ãÑ 𝑣,
where 𝛼 is a rational number in the range p0, 1s. If 𝛼 is 1, then this permission
grants unique read-write access to the memory location 𝑙; if 𝛼 is less than 1,
then it grants shared read access. The following conversion rule allows splitting
and joining fractional permissions:
p𝑙
𝛼`𝛽
ãÑ 𝑣q “ p𝑙
𝛼
ãÑ 𝑣q ‹ p𝑙
𝛽
ãÑ 𝑣q when 𝛼, 𝛽, p𝛼` 𝛽q P p0, 1s
Thanks to this rule, one can transition from a regime where a single thread
has read-write access to a regime where several threads have read-only access,
and back. Fractional permissions are not duplicable, and must not be carelessly
discarded: indeed, in order to move back from read-only regime to read-write
regime, one must prove that “no share has been lost” and that the fraction 1 has
been recovered. This requires “accounting”, that is, arithmetic reasoning, as well
as returning fractional permissions in postconditions. In contrast, our proposal
is less expressive in some ways (for instance, it does not support unstructured
concurrency; see §6.2) but does not require accounting: our read-only permissions
can be freely duplicated and discarded.
Fractional permissions also allow expressing a form of irrevocable (as opposed
to temporary) read-only permissions. Define p𝑙
ro
ãÑ 𝑣q as follows:
p𝑙
ro
ãÑ 𝑣q “ D𝛼 P p0, 1q. p𝑙
𝛼
ãÑ 𝑣q
From this definition, it follows that p𝑙
ro
ãÑ 𝑣q is duplicable. It also follows that
p𝑙
1
ãÑ 𝑣q can be converted to p𝑙
ro
ãÑ 𝑣q, but not the other way around: the transition
from read-write to read-only mode, in this case, is permanent.
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In the systems of fractional permissions mentioned above, the fraction 𝛼
is built into the points-to assertion 𝑙
𝛼
ãÑ 𝑣. Boyland [7] studies a more general
idea, “scaling”, where any permission 𝐻 can be scaled by a fraction: that is,
𝐻 ::“ 𝛼.𝐻 is part of the syntax of permissions. Scaling seems a desirable fea-
ture, as it allows expressing read-only access to an abstract data structure, as
in, say, 12 pℎ  HashTable𝑀q, which is impossible when scaling is built into
points-to assertions. However, scaling exhibits a problematic interaction with
disjunction and existential quantification. Boyland shows that “reasoning with a
fractional unrestricted existential is unsound” [7, §5.4]. In short, it seems difficult
to find a model that validates both of the laws p𝛼.𝐻q ‹ p𝛽.𝐻q “ p𝛼` 𝛽q.𝐻 and
𝛼.pD𝑥.𝐻q “ D𝑥. p𝛼.𝐻q. Indeed, under these laws, 12 .p𝑙1 ãÑ 𝑣q ‹
1
2 .p𝑙2 ãÑ 𝑣q entails
D𝑙. p1.p𝑙 ãÑ 𝑣qq, which does not make intuitive sense. Boyland escapes this prob-
lem by restricting the existential quantifier so that it is precise: the construct
D𝑥.𝐻 is replaced with D𝑦. p𝑥 ãÑ 𝑦 ‹𝐻q. In contrast, our read-only permissions
do not require any such restriction, yet do support “scaling”, in the sense that
“RO” can be applied to an arbitrary permission: ROp𝐻q is well-formed and has
well-defined meaning for every 𝐻.
Chalice offers “abstract read permissions” [20], an elaborate layer of syn-
tactic sugar above fractional permissions. An abstract read permission, which
could be written 𝑙
rd
ãÑ 𝑣, is translated to a fractional permission 𝑙
𝜖
ãÑ 𝑣, where the
variable 𝜖 stands for an unknown fraction. The variable 𝜖 is suitably quantified:
for instance, if this abstract read permission appears in a method specification,
then 𝜖 is universally quantified in front of this specification [20, §4.1]. The system
is powerful enough to automatically introduce and instantiate quantifiers and au-
tomatically split and join fractional permissions where needed. Unfortunately,
because abstract read permissions are just fractional permissions, they are not
duplicable, and they must not be carelessly discarded: they must be returned
(or transferred to some other thread) so that the fraction 1 can eventually be
recovered. Also, it is not known to us whether abstract read permissions can be
explained to the programmer in a direct manner, without reference to fractional
permissions.
In a somewhat related vein, Aldrich et al. [25] propose a type system where
(among other features) out of a “unique” reference, any number of “local im-
mutable” references can be temporarily “borrowed”. The type system internally
relies on integer accounting, but this is hidden from the user.
6 Potential applications and extensions
6.1 Where read-only permissions could (or could not) help
The second author has specified and proved an OCaml implementation of hash
tables [28], in Separation Logic, using the first author’s tool, CFML. Iterating
on a hash table is possible either via a higher-order function, HashTable.iter,
or via “cascades”, a form of iterators, built by the function HashTable.cascade.
In either case, the specification should ideally be stated in such a way that the
consumer has read-only access to the table while iteration is in progress. For this
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purpose, the abstract predicate ℎ HashTable𝑀 , which gives unique read-write
access, is not appropriate. A finer-grained predicate, ℎ HashTableInState𝑀 𝑠,
is introduced, where 𝑠 is an abstract name for the current concrete state of the
table. Then, a function that does not modify the table, like population, requires
the permission ℎ  HashTableInState𝑀 𝑠 and returns it. (It is polymorphic
in 𝑠.) In contrast, a function that does modify the table, like resize, also requires
ℎ HashTableInState𝑀 𝑠, but returns D𝑠1. ℎ HashTableInState𝑀 𝑠1. In fact,
because ℎ HashTable𝑀 is an abbreviation for D𝑠. ℎ HashTableInState𝑀 𝑠,
one can simply say that resize requires and returns ℎ HashTable𝑀 .
The specification of HashTable.iter (not shown here) involves universal
quantification over 𝑠 and the predicate ℎ  HashTableInState𝑀 𝑠. This allows
expressing the fact that iter does not modify the table and requires the function
that it receives as an argument to not modify it either. Read-only permissions,
if implemented in CFML, would help simplify this specification. It would be
sufficient to state that iter requires the permission ROpℎ HashTable𝑀q and
passes it on to the function that it receives as an argument.
The specification of HashTable.cascade (not shown either) also exploits 𝑠
in order to express the fact that the iterator returned by cascade remains valid
as long as the hash table is not modified. Unfortunately, because our read-only
permissions have lexical scope, they cannot help state a simpler specification.
Indeed, the iterator outlives the call to cascade: it still needs read access after
this call is finished.
6.2 Parallelism and concurrency
We believe that our read-only permissions remain sound when the calculus is
extended with “structured parallelism”, that is, with a term construct 𝑡 ::“
p𝑡 ‖ 𝑡q for evaluating two terms in parallel. The parallel composition rule of
Concurrent Separation Logic [26] can be used:
parallel composition
t𝐻1u 𝑡1 t𝑄1u t𝐻2u 𝑡2 t𝑄2u
t𝐻1 ‹𝐻2u p𝑡1 ‖ 𝑡2q t𝑄1 ‹𝑄2u
Because read-only permissions are duplicable, this rule, combined with the rule
of consequence, allows read access to be shared between the threads 𝑡1 and 𝑡2.
That is, the following rule is derivable:
parallel composition with shared read
t𝐻1 ‹ ROp𝐻
1qu 𝑡1 t𝑄1u t𝐻2 ‹ ROp𝐻
1qu 𝑡2 t𝑄2u
t𝐻1 ‹𝐻2 ‹ ROp𝐻
1qu p𝑡1 ‖ 𝑡2q t𝑄1 ‹𝑄2u
This rule can be used to share read access between any number of threads.
By combining it with the read-only frame rule, one obtains the following rule,
which allows a mutable data structure (represented by the permission 𝐻 1) to
temporarily be made accessible for reading to several threads and to become
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again accessible for reading and writing once these threads are finished:
parallel composition with temporary shared read
t𝐻1 ‹ ROp𝐻
1qu 𝑡1 t𝑄1u t𝐻2 ‹ ROp𝐻
1qu 𝑡2 t𝑄2u normal𝐻
1
t𝐻1 ‹𝐻2 ‹𝐻
1u p𝑡1 ‖ 𝑡2q t𝑄1 ‹𝑄2 ‹𝐻 1u
At present, we do not have a proof that the parallel composition rule is
sound. Our current proof technique apparently cannot easily accommodate it,
primarily because it is based on a big-step operational semantics (Figure 3),
which (to the best of our knowledge) cannot be easily extended to support
parallel composition p𝑡1 ‖ 𝑡2q.
These remarks lead to several questions. Could Separation Logic with read-
only permissions be proved sound, based on a small-step operational semantics?
Could the logic and its proof then be extended with support for structured
parallelism? There seems to be no reason why they could not, but this requires
further research.
Another question arises: could Separation Logic with read-only permissions
be extended so as to support unstructured parallelism, that is, shared-memory
concurrency with explicit threads and synchronization facilities, such as locks
and channels? We do not have an answer. We know that näıvely transmitting a
read-only permission from one thread to another would be unsound. So, prob-
ably, the logic would have to be made more complex, perhaps by explicitly
annotating read-only permissions with “lifetime” information. Whether this can
be done while preserving the simplicity of the approach is an open question.
After all, the whole approach is worthwhile only as long as it remains signifi-
cantly simpler than fractional permissions (§5.4), which offer a well-understood
solution to this problem.
7 Conclusion
We have extended sequential Separation Logic with a simple form of temporary
read-only permissions. We have argued that they can (at least in some situations)
express more concise, more accurate, more useful specifications and give rise to
simpler proofs. Our proposal involves very few additions to Separation Logic,
namely the “RO” modality; the read-only frame rule, which subsumes the frame
rule; and a generalized sequencing rule. We have given semantic meaning to
read-only permissions and to Hoare triples in terms of heaps that include “ghost”
access rights information. We have formalized the logic and its proof of soundness
in Coq. We hope to implement read-only permissions in CFML [11] in the future.
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